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Abstract
The high reliance of nuclear weapons on computers has outstretched
the susceptibilities of the cyber war against them. While other countries
are not discounting the cyber threat against its nuclear weapons, India
has officially maintained the position that the present systems and
technologies that it is employing, ensures safe handling of its nuclear
assets against all cyber-attacks. However, there are certain loopholes
in the present C2 structures, which need to be examined and addressed.
The cyber threats against the nuclear C2 structures can cause delay in
India’s response time, in a situation of retaliation. In such a scenario, it
would be difficult to absorb the extent of the first strike of the enemy,
and the cyber warfare may result in a catastrophic impact on the
communication systems. A cyber-attack can also be the cause for
technical failures in the civil nuclear program, which may lead to
uncontrolled leakage of radiation. This article explores various
possibilities of cyber warfare against India’s nuclear weapon systems,
which can be a serious threat to its critical infrastructure.
Keywords: Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Security, Cyber war, India,
Command and Control Structure, Retaliation
Introduction
Nuclear weapons were developed in 1945 and though they were not immune
to cyber threats then, there was an absence of any challenge from the cyber
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domain. However, the integration of the nuclear command and control (C&C)
structures with computers has given rise to the dependability of nuclear weapons
on cyber tools (Gartze and Lindsay 2017, 37) and has raised a new threat
perspective that cyber-attacks and warfare can be conducted against nuclear
assets as well. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has
acknowledged the seriousness of cyber threats to nuclear weapons. In June 2015,
the IAEA hosted an international conference on “Computer Security in a Nuclear
World” in Vienna. The IAEA Director General, Yukiya Amano called for an
international response to tackle the global threat posed by criminals and terrorists
bent on launching cyber-attacks against nuclear facilities. (Donovan 2015) He
emphasized on the importance of strengthening computer security capabilities
at the State and facility level, to guard against cyber threats that could adversely
affect nuclear security. It is an absolute necessity to ensure fool-proof cyber
security of the nuclear assets since potential cyber threats could have a security
impact upon the nuclear security systems and may damage it. The Director
General mentioned:
Strengthening computer security capabilities at the State and facility
level, to guard against cyber threats that could adversely affect nuclear
security, remains a high priority for the Agency and for Member States.
(Director General Statement at High Level Dialogue on Nuclear Security
2017).
Computer security constitutes an important aspect of nuclear security with
the newly expanding application of digital systems. With increasing
digitalization, India has gradually emerged as a significant target from the cyber
security point of view. Digitalization has led to heavy reliance on digital
instrumentation or digital control systems or computer based information systems
(IS). Further, the dependability of nuclear weapons on C&C structures, which
are linked to computers, gives rise to the possibility of a cyber intrusion against
them. This development has augmented the threat of compromising nuclear
C&C structures.
Recently, several government departments in India have faced repeated
cyber-attacks. These departments include the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO),
the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force,
the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and many other
Indian websites (India is quietly preparing a cyber-war unit to fight this new
enemy from 2018). According to the 2018 Internet Security Threat Report, “India
has emerged as the third most vulnerable country to cyber threats, such as
malware, spam and ransom ware, in 2017.” (Bhargava 2018).
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With a burgeoning population, increasing internet literacy, expanding critical
infrastructure and a rapidly developing economy, India has become vulnerable
to cyber terrorism and cyber espionage. As a state with advanced nuclear
capability, India is vigilant towards potential cyber threats to its nuclear weapons
system. Despite this, there is a huge gap in India’s capability and capacity to
safeguard against a potential cyber intrusion. The rising magnitude of cyber
threats makes it important to safeguard our cyberspace with an anticipation of
possible attacks. This paper focuses on the various vulnerabilities existing in
India’s nuclear assets within the cyber realm. It examines whether India’s nuclear
forces, particularly its C&C structures are sufficiently protected against possible
cyber-attacks.
Meaning and Scope of the Term ‘Cyber Warfare’
There has been no definitive explanation of cyber warfare. According to the
US Joint Chief of Staff, cyber war is an armed conflict conducted through ‘cyber’
means to deny the opposing force to make effective use of their cyber space
systems and weapons systems. (Joint Terminology for Cyber Space Actions
2010) The Tallinn Manual of International Law asserts that a cyber-attack is a
cyber-operation (offensive or defensive), that is expected to cause injury or
death to people, and/or damage or destruction to objects.’ (The Tallinn Manual
of International Law 2013) These definitions emphasize that cyber warfare may
constitute an intentional offensive act by an adversary to interrupt the cyberspace
of the target nation with the intention to achieve the desired political and military
objectives. Additionally, there also exist differences among the experts on what
the term ‘cyber’ actually means, which in turn has an impact on the perception,
nature and scope of the challenge posed by the cyber threat. The word cyber
here focuses on four main areas as explained in the following Table-1.
Figure-1: The Four Main Areas of Cyber
Mechanical Domain 
 
It includes all physical infrastructure and hardware such as wires, 
computers, communication notes, etc. 
Logical Domain 
 
It consists of commands, which tell the hardware what to do and the 
software that allows transmission, creation and circulation of information. 
Information and 
Data Domain 
 
It incorporates all data that the system collects or stores. 
Cognitive Domain 
 
It includes human beings and their interaction with the hardware, software 
and information 
Source: Andrew Futter, “‘Cyber’ semantics: why we should retire the latest buzzword in security
studies”, Journal of Cyber Policy, 3:1, 2018, p. 205.
This means that any kind of cyber challenge may consist of attacks on any
of the above four domains. Cyber warfare consists of cyber-attacks and cyber
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exploitation. The primary goal of cyber warfare is destruction of websites and
generating false information, (Schreier 2015) while cyber-attacks aim for
unauthorized access to computers, computer systems or networks to gain
information. (Roscini 2014, 134) Evidently, cyber-attacks on nuclear weapon
systems can become a stark reality, which the states may ignore only at their
own peril. Cyber attacks may not only retard nuclear facility operations, but
also compromise critical components within the C&C structures.
Cyberspace suffers from inherent vulnerabilities because of the existence
of innumerable entry points into the internet. (Saraswat 2018) With the
development of increasingly vulnerable technologies, hackers are regularly
seeking unauthorized access to closely guarded information and storming
sensitive databases. There are various methods by which cyber warfare can be
carried out like denial of service attack, (DoS) malware software attacks, etc as
explained in the following Figure-1.
 
 
Cyber Attacks  
Malicious Code 
a. Virus 
b. Worm 
c. Torjon 
d. Bots/Boteness 
e. Browser 
Parasites 
f. Adware 
g. Spyware  
Unwanted program  
Spam   Phishing  
Sniffing  
Spoofing 
DoS and DDoS Insider Attacks 
These attacks are enabled when a computer system is exposed to the rest of
the world or the inherent flaws within the system are exploited. The problem is
that increasing the complexity of the system may not result into protection from
cyber war. The more complex the codes are, the more increased possibility of
hiding errors.
Such kinds of cyber-attacks may help the adversary to control the information
or to influence the information, which may help it in achieving strategic
objectives during war. Here, control of information means gaining access of the
information about the other party or denying the opponent from accessing its
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own information. Influencing the information means providing false information
that could cause the radar system to register false positives at times; displaying
images/information that actually do not exist. In such situations, the adversary
may not be able to detect the invasion of the opponent thus leaving it exposed
to a vulnerable position.
A critical issue is that the impact of the cyber war will be temporary. The
computer systems, which will be affected by it can be recovered intact at a later
stage. However, the after effects of the cyber war will be manifold, especially
when they are combined with the kinetic war that the cyber war causes. In the
latter case, it could have a devastating impact upon the nuclear weapons
capabilities of the opponent state.
The methods mentioned in Figure-1 can prove to be attractive means to
rampage nuclear facilities all over the world. The first cyber-attack involving
strategic assets took place in October 1979 when the North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) indicated that a missile was launched from a
submarine in the waters off the West Coast. (Board 1980, 1183) In recent times,
there have been serious incidents of cyber attacks on nuclear and related systems.
For example, British researchers discovered in 2012 that Chinese manufactured
computer chips used in military weapon systems, nuclear plants, etc, all over
the world contain a secret ‘backdoor’ that could facilitate disabling or
reprogramming the chip remotely. (Curtis 2012) In a series of digital attacks
between 2009-2010, the Stuxnet computer worm that probably arrived at Iran’s
nuclear plant Natanz on an infected USB stick attacked and infiltrated over
fifteen Iranian facilities within Iran’s Natanz nuclear power plant.* Reportedly,
the recent hacking into the defence networks and intelligence agencies at the
Pentagon by hackers, largely from Russia and China has increased the US
concern. (Deen 2015)  The most notable case of cyber-nuclear espionage was
seen by Israel. In 2006, the Israeli Mossad planted a Trojan in the computer of
the Syrian government which revealed the nature and extent of their nuclear
weapons program. Later, this resulted in Operation Orchard, (Follarth and Stark
2009) whereby Israel attacked and destroyed the Syrian nuclear facilities. It has
also raised the bar for possible cyber attacks by the Islamic State (IS) that has
showed penchant for cyber technology for disseminating their influence on social
media.
As opined by the IAEA chief, Amano “reports of actual or attempted cyber-
attacks are now virtually a daily occurrence.” India is aware of the increasing
cyber threats to its critical infrastructure including its nuclear facilities. According
to a report prepared in April-June 2018 by the Indian Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT-In), 35 percent of the cyber-attacks that the Indian
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cyberspace witnessed came from China (Manral 2018) followed by US (17%),
Russia (15%), Pakistan (9%), Canada (7%) and Germany (5%) (China was
responsible for over a third of the cyber attacks on many official Indian sites,
NSCS informed -2018).
India has hence embarked on a vigorous policy to strengthen its nuclear
security systems including its cyber security systems. (Indian National Progress
Report 2016) On June 19, 2018, the Department of Defence held a workshop
on the development of the Cyber Security Framework. At the inauguration, the
Defence Minister, Mrs Nirmala Sitharaman acknowledged that the Defence
sector is more prone to cyber threats and hence it becomes important to safeguard
our cyberspace with anticipation of possible attacks. (Workshop on cyber security
framework 2018) Any incapacitation of critical information databases and/or
cyber security within India’s Defence sector would pose a serious threat,
devastating consequences and compromise India’s national security. The Defence
Ministry seeks to develop a plan to implement a policy to safeguard the country’s
cyberspace. A Task Force involving experts from Industry, Academia, DRDO,
and Government has been set up to chalk out a strategic roadmap for Defence
in the area of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics in 2018 (Draft Defence
Production Policy 2018). The aim is to provide support to invigorate cyber
security infrastructure for the defence sector.
The Possibility of Cyber Attacks on India’s Nuclear Assets
Understandably, India has always upheld high secrecy regarding its nuclear
weapons and their related C&C structure.** India’s nuclear C&C comprises of
the scientific establishment, military establishment, and the political authorities
and they operate in close coordination with each other.
The uppermost echelons of India’s nuclear command and control structure
consists of the National Command Authority (NCA, which is further divided
into the Political and Executive Councils. The Political Council has the right to
take a decision regarding the use of nuclear weapons. The Executive Council
provides the essential inputs to the Political Council, which are vital for
retaliatory action and execution of the directives of the Political Council. The
Strategic Forces Command (SFC) established in January 2003 aims to manage
and to administer all these strategic forces. The Political Council could directly
contact the SFC in case of a prompt retaliatory action. (The Cabinet Committee
on Security Reviews pre-rationalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine 2003).
The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and DRDO keep India’s nuclear
warheads in a de-mated posture. The DAE is accountable to the Prime Minister
and the DRDO functions directly under the Defense Minister. (Kanwal 2006)
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India’s elaborate C&C structures demand a high-level coordination between
the DRDO, DAE and the military, both in peace as well as at crisis times. Within
the military, there is a close coordination among the Chairman Chief of Staff
Committee (COSC), Chief of Integrated Defense Staff (CIDS) and the
Commander-in-Chief Strategic Force Command (C-in-C SFC). It is anticipated
that this multifaceted nuclear C2 of India has made or is making the nuclear
weapons more secure.
India’s Nuclear Retaliation
The general procedure to be followed in case of retaliation with nuclear
weapons is not available in the public domain. The following interpretations
have been drawn from various interviews with army officers, ex-DRDO officials
and many other research published in this area. The procedure to be followed is
as under:
• The chain of nuclear C&C will flow from NCA to DAE, DRDO and
finally to SFC to launch control centres.
• The launch orders are given jointly by two people in India – the Prime
Minister and the SFC Commander. (Interview Conducted on 16th May
2018).
• As soon as a first strike is carried out on India, the warning order will be
passed to the nuclear forces by the NCP. Simultaneously, efforts will be
taken to obtain information regarding the strike and the damage caused
by the early information net system.
• This will be followed by the meeting between the PM, Foreign
Minister, and the Chairman of the CSOC, in which the decision to
retaliate will be weighed upon.
• Once the decision to retaliate has been taken, the PM will send the
authentication codes to the nuclear forces.*** The electronic codes
received from the PM will be matched by the codes of the SFC, the
intermediate control, and LCCs to confirm its authenticity. (Interview
Conducted on 16th May 2018).
• Based on the directions received from the COSC through the NCP, the
SFC will pass orders for the engagement of targets at LCCs and the Air
Force Wings where aircraft for aerial delivery is located. The
intermediate control centres will listen in. The orders will be communi-
cated to the Naval Station for the induction of SSBNs.
• A few minutes before the launch, the NCA will forward the codes for
unlocking the Permissive Action Links (PALs) in the warheads, which
will be communicated to the units concerned. (Phawa 2008, 95).
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• At LCCs, the codes received by NCA will be matched with the already
existing codes. If they match, the order will be considered as authentic.
PAL codes for unlocking weapons will be fed into the weapons when
received. The drill for launching the weapons will be carried out by two
members of the crew in each LCC.
• In case of aircraft delivering the weapons, the authentication codes will
be passed to the concerned wing. The warheads will be unlocked and
then loaded into the aircraft. The aircraft may remain on the ground or
get airborne and move to an RV and await further instructions from the
NCP.
• Communications to the SSBN will be dependent on Very Low Frequency
(VLF) and Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) and would be routed
through navy. Having a PAL system will be difficult for SSBNs because
of the long time involved to transmit codes on VLF and ELF. (Phawa
2008, 96).
• Thereafter, the final launch of the nuclear weapons will be conducted.
Noteworthy, India adheres to a NFU policy whereby it will retaliate only
after a nuclear, biological or chemical attack has been launched by the enemy.
India has reiterated that it will not be the first to carry out a nuclear weapons
attack on any of its adversaries. (The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews
pre-rationalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine 2003)1
Two things are of utmost importance:
1. India requires to be able to assess the degree of danger inflicted by the
first strike of the opponent. It is vital for NCA to have information vis-
à-vis the numbers, characteristics and deployment of enemy’s nuclear
weapons, its C&C structure etc. After this, it is crucial to have
information about the total weapons, which have survived the first
strike. These factors will decide India’s retaliatory action.
2. It is assumed that India should be able to retaliate within a particular
time frame. Firstly, such a time frame will thwart the chances of
accidental or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. Secondly, soon after
the first attacks, there will be international pressure on India not to
carry out nuclear strikes on the adversary. Thirdly, a longer time for
retaliation raises another fear that an enemy could launch a second
attack destroying all the retaliatory capability of India. (Phawa 2008,
101).
These two points prove without a doubt that India needs to have a high
level of secure and quick C2 systems to enable successful retaliation. Any
115
disruption within the C&C system resulting from cyber warfare agents will
increase the reaction time of India’s retaliation and impede India’s military
operations. There can be an uncontrolled impact of such cyber warfare and can
potentially result in catastrophic attacks upon the critical infrastructure and pose
major risks for radioactive and nuclear materials in the nuclear field. It is
important to note that such degree of cyber warfare are mostly politically
motivated and targeted to cripple a nation.
India’s Position on Cyber Warfare against Nuclear Weapons
India has maintained that there are no gaps or any possibility left for having
a cyber-warfare against the nuclear assets of India. The reasons given are as
follows:
1. The electronic control systems and plant control systems are designed
and developed in-house using custom build hardware and software
subjected to regular verification and validation.
2. The critical infrastructure of India is isolated from the internet.
3. There is a system of quarterly cyber security audit of DAE, and they
submit all their reports to Computer and Information Security Advisory
Group (CISAG) of DAE.
4. The DAE also involves Standardisation Testing and Quality Certification
(STQC) of Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology to test
those systems, which are connected to the internet and where there
could be any possibilities of vulnerabilities.
5. The DAE also took part in drills conducted by the Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT) of India to prepare for and to actually face
cyber-attacks. (Government of India 2017).
6. Similarly, India has designed safe and reliable designs, that have
control and protection features to detect any deviation in plant safety
parameters. It has several safety features like even the automatic
shutdown of the reactor.
7. Even if, any radioactivity is released, there are arrangements by Emer-
gency Preparedness and Response Emergency Preparedness and
Response to protect the people from the harmful radiations. (Government
of India 2017).
Despite the vigorous safeguards against potential cyber intrusions, it is
undeniable that India is heavily dependent on computer systems and to some
extent, the internet in all sectors including defence. Arguably, one cannot stop
viruses from entering into cyberspace. The moment one virus is removed, hackers
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are already working on it to introduce a different type of virus. So cyber “warfare
is a continuum…. it will never stop.” (Bagla 2018) Most equipment and
technology for setting up cyber security infrastructure in India are currently
procured from global sources. These systems are vulnerable to cyber threats
just like any other connected system. Besides, many engineered systems of
nuclear weapons are still dependent on digital computational parts that can be
hacked easily. Any cyber-attack on such digital infrastructure, which is critical
in nature, poses a serious risks to the coordination of the various agencies within
the nuclear establishment. It may trigger a false or no information alarm and
lead to non-working of the nuclear weapons system. According to Tariq Rauf,
director of the Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Programme
at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (SIPRI) nuclear power
plants and the nuclear industry rely intensively on computer systems and
computer codes. (Deen 2015) One can assume, that given India’s dependency
on digital technology, it may rely on computer systems and computer codes not
only for its nuclear power plants but also for the launching and security of its
nuclear weapons. Hence, any targeted attacks through any malware could have
catastrophic consequences for both our nuclear safety and security.
While the wave of digital technology has brought in revolutionary changes
towards development, it has also resulted in the surge of sophisticated hackers
who are being trained to be cyber warriors for various offensive cyber activities
like hacking, espionage and intrusion. These hackers sometimes act as lone
wolves or are trained by rogue nations to develop innovative methods for
launching cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure systems. They attack hardware
or firmware, which affects the root of trust. Since the security of software is
more difficult, hackers find it easier to exploit the lower stack in the technological
infrastructure like the physical aspects of computer systems and its components.
This way, cyber warriors are able to compromise a system and undermine the
core trust of the device.
Possible Vulnerabilities of India’s Nuclear Arsenals to Cyber Warfare
A. Systems designed by India to assess the damage of first strike and vehicle
transportation systems:
There have been systems in India to read the degree of radiations emitted
during a nuclear and radiological emergency. According to the Government of
India, there are five main circumstances in which it is assumed that nuclear
emergency has been declared:
• An accident taking place in any nuclear facility of the nuclear fuel cycle
including the nuclear reactor, or in a facility using radioactive sources.
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• A ‘criticality’ accident in a nuclear fuel cycle.
• An accident during the transportation of radioactive material.
• The malicious use of radioactive material by terrorists for dispersing
radioactive material in the environment.
•  A large-scale nuclear disaster resulting from a nuclear weapon attack.
[(as had happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan) (Management
of Nuclear and Radiological Emergency)]
Therefore, to respond to any crisis, it is first essential to know that the crisis
has actually occurred. For this, India has designed a National Disaster Monitoring
System which is dependent upon computers to provide relevant information.
The Bhabha Atomic Research Centre BARC has established 24 radiation
monitoring centres across the country to provide online information regarding
radiation levels at various locations in the country. (ensuring Safety of
Professionals) This information is dependent on computers that can be hacked
or jammed by the enemy. Under such conditions, it will be difficult for India to
access any information. Cyber war against these systems will result in increased
time for India to retaliate and impede communication with the DAE. (as it is
believed that nuclear attack might disturb other communication means such as
telecommunications as well).
The problem becomes more acute when these technologies are used to track
the vehicle, which is carrying such radiological materials. Radiological materials
are transported during the time of crises, as they need to be assembled for firing
a nuclear warhead. For this, GPS systems have been mounted on the vehicles
carrying these sensitive materials. (Electronic Tracking for the transport of
nuclear and other material) The problem is that GPS systems can be ‘spoofed’
carrying a satellite causing it to read a faulty data. This may further create
problems for India to carry out ‘retaliation’.  Further, the AERB has mentioned
about the existence of the electronic systems to ensure the safe transfer of nuclear
material. (Security of Radioactive Sources in Radiation Facilities) Typically, an
electronic tracking device is fixed to the vehicle carrying the nuclear material.
Electronic tracking uses GPS, satellite communication or cellular general packet
radio services. (GPRS) These three systems work together to know the transit
of the vehicle. Any disturbance, jamming or faulty information may lead to a
‘sabotage’ of the radiological items.
B. Pal systems of India
In India, there are ‘codes’ which are needed to unlock the nuclear weapon
system and to mount it on the warhead. However, no open source has mentioned
the form of these codes i.e., electronic/non-electronic. The officers working on
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the issue have mentioned in questionnaires that these codes are no doubt
electronic, something similar to the PAL system of the US.
PAL was designed to prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Some
of these systems can disable and destroy the nuclear weapons in case of some
incidents of tempering. Now, the concern has been mentioned that these systems
can be prone to cyber-attacks. PAL codes are entered to arm the weapons and
the messages are sent in digital format via the secure Automatic Digital Network
and then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters to High-
Frequency Global Communications System. It is feared that the PAL systems
are prone to cyber-attacks. The questionnaire responded by the anonymous (See
Annexure 1) mentioned that India do have a digital code systems on the line of
the US. Even, when the nuclear warheads are loaded on the missiles, the codes
are used. Under such conditions, the possibility of cyber threats against these
codes cannot be ignored.
C. India’s nuclear weapons: No longer de-mated
The argument that India’s nuclear warheads are in a de-mated status and are
not prone to cyber threats is not entirely true. The Kargil Conflict 1999 and the
2001 Parliament attacks made India realize that it needs new institutional
procedures for operational readiness. (Kampani 2015, 386) During the Kargil
war, the civil bureaucracy assumed that India could retaliate within 72 hours.
However, the time taken to assemble nuclear weapon was around one week.
The 2001-02 crisis also shows an actual gap between the plans and papers
concerning operational readiness and the actual possibility of a launch of nuclear
weapons. As a result, new protocols have been ensured to address this gap,
which states that
1. The first state of nuclear force alteration begins simultaneously with
only conventional mobilization.
2. The second stage involves mating of a nuclear warhead with the trigger.
3. The final stage involves the firing of the nuclear weapons. (Kampani
2015, 386).
Further, new missiles like Agni V have the canister system, meaning that
India is not entirely following the de-mated system of the nuclear missiles.
(India test fires Agni 5 Ballistic Missiles, the trial successful 2018)  This factor
alone raises the threshold of the cyber-attacks on the nuclear weapons.
D. Hacking of SSBNs system
India’s adversaries may have the technique to hack the much-talked about,
Arihant missile, which has given India a much-needed nuclear submarine
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capability. Nuclear submarines are considered as a vital part of nuclear deterrence
because they can stay hidden underwater for a considerable amount of time.
Nuclear submarines generally depend on the ELF or VLF radio waves for
communications because only very low or extremely low frequencies can
penetrate the water at those depths. (Singh and Pal 2003) The adversary may
have the potential to hack the transmitters carrying these radio waves. (Futter
2018, 144) This can probably have an impact on the second retaliatory capability
and the operations to be carried out by nuclear submarines.
E. Use of space and satellites in nuclear weapons launch
The realm of outer space has increasingly become a part of the nuclear
C&C system. (Lele 2011, 290), India is working on the development of the
fourth generation GSAT to connect all the three domains that are sea-based
assets, (warships, nuclear submarines, and aircraft carriers) land-based assets,
(troops formation, conventional war technology, ballistic and cruise missiles)
and air force assets. (combat aircraft) (Ehtisham 2018) These kinds of
communication satellites help the armed forces to carry out communication
between different parts of the C&C structure, which is vital during a nuclear
weapons launch.
India is dependent on 13 satellites to carry out remote sensing activities.
(Singh 2017)  These 13 satellites include the recently launched Cartosat-1,
Carosat-2 and RISAT-1 and RISAT-2 satellites. These satellites can be used to
detect images during the night. (Cartosat-1: 10 years completion in Orbit from
2005–2015) India has the SAR system, which gives data about weather
conditions, terrain features, exact locations of the targets, and information like
whether such targets are surrounded by civilian population, and if so, what is
the total number of the concentration of civilian population. SAR can help to
differentiate between terrain features and actual targets. (Lele 2012) This shows
India’s dependency on various satellites to carry out and/or perform essential
functions in nuclear C&C systems.
India uses satellite, as well as telemetry data during missile flight. According
to Rajaram Nagappa, telemetry is a method of onboard measurement of data
and its transmission to the ground stations. There are various parameters like
pressure, temperature, strain, electric current and voltage, which are monitored
onboard and then these are transmitted. This can even include information about
the health of the vehicle. It has been mentioned that DRDO makes the onboard
computers and these are hence, highly unlikely to be hacked. Further, they run
on the Linux system rather than Windows, which makes them even more secure
against cyber threats. However, the possibility of the satellites being hacked
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cannot be ignored.  Telemetry is also used to analyze whether the missile has
followed the designed path and whether it has attained the desired height of
burst. Till now, India has used telemetry data for carrying out missile tests.
(Kampani 1998) There are incidents in the past where the military satellites
were hacked in the US. (Kumar 2018) If the adversary processes the same in
India, it could pose several problems ranging from early warning, to detection
of targets from the earth and disturbance of the communication systems. This
would adversely interfere with the launch of nuclear weapons.
F. Terrorist cyber-attacks on civilian nuclear reactors
The threat of cyber-attacks by terrorist groups is far greater than that
compared to cyber attacks by states. The reason is that it requires very little
investment and little computer knowledge, which is available easily.  In India,
such threats are addressed by CISAG that is responsible for conducting audits
of information systems, framing guidelines and plans for mitigating cyber-attacks
and its effects. (Kazi and Nayan 2016, 28) The use of a USB or external driver
is forbidden to secure vital computer systems. In addition, there is limited internet
connectivity in the area. However, new hacking techniques have made cyber
warfare against these systems, a possibility. (Rajagopalan 2016).
The DAE mentioned that AERB has prescribed necessary codes, guides
and other regulatory documents to ensure safety of nuclear weapons. They also
have their own licensing systems to ensure safety of nuclear plants. The AERB
also conducts regular inspections to monitor compliance with the established
regulatory requirements. (Lok Sabha Starred Question No51 2016).
The civilian nuclear facilities of India consist of a large number of computers
distributed across the plants. These computers are responsible for performing
various functions like protection of the reactor safety, control functions from
information collected from displays, etc. If information on these computer
systems is hacked by malicious elements, it could lead to severe accidental
conditions. (Babu 2013).
There are two main systems for security in any nuclear facility: Instrument
and Control Security (ICS) and Facility Network Security (FNS). The ICS ensures
safety and controls systems such as the reactor protection system, reactor trip
system and power regulation system. The FNS, on the other hand, secures the
monitoring network, which has the administrative, and management functions.
If there is a cyber-war against these systems, FNS will lead to transmission of
data that may be lost or transmitted to external persons. Alternatively, ICS failure
could lead to a series of situations including the release of radioactivity. Any
modification in the software of ICS will result in problems related to safety.
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The safety mechanisms will not be executed at the required rate or in the required
response time. (Babu 2013).
The DAE states that in case of any such events, there will be an automatic
shutdown of the reactor thus minimizing the chances of spreading radiological
emissions. However, their dependence on the computers cannot be ignored.
Any delay in the computer system resulting from the cyber-attacks may prevent
the shutdown of the system.
G. False information through social media to create disturbance
In present times, social media, especially twitter has emerged as an important
platform for transfer of personal information to the world at large. These accounts
are largely not very well protected and it is relatively easy to hack an account
and to pass on wrong information, which may create panic and disturbance at
large. In short, the risk of ‘spoofing’ is always present in such systems. For
example, In July 2014, the Israeli military twitter account handle was hacked
and a report was published that a top secret nuclear facility at Dimona had been
attacked by rockets which had caused a radiation catastrophe. (Tadeo 2014)
Spreading such false information may be more attractive to terrorists.
Emerging Cyber War Threat without the Internet, WiFI or Router
It is a misconception that cyber-attacks cannot happen if a computer is not
connected to internet, intranet, WiFi or router. The incident of Stuxnet virus on
Iranian enrichment facilities have clearly shown that cyber-attacks can be carried
out even without the internet. (Zetter 2014) There are six main ways, as
mentioned below, through which air-gripped systems can be exploited:
1. Via an ‘insider’ threat which is perhaps the most important and perhaps
the easiest method. Such insider threats can be deliberate or uninten-
tional. (Due to ignorance of the employee or negligence).
2. Through remote maintenance and dial-in ports, i.e. by hacking.
3. By developing and accessing built-in backdoors, remotely. (These may
have been developed when the system was manufactured.)
4. By jumping the air gap via other electromagnetic tools.
5. By wiretapping.
6. By intercepting radar and other insecure communications.
7. Exposing the computer systems during upgradation of some software
or during the maintenance of the system. (Futter 2018, 102).
Karl Grindal explains an episode of the attack on the US air gripped systems:
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In the summer of 2008, an infected thumb drive, possibly dropped in a
parking lot or slipped into briefcase, was inserted into a US military laptop on a
base in the Middle East, The technically advanced virus stored on the USB
stick penetrated the air gap that separates the military’s secure networks from
the internet at large, infecting both classified and unclassified networks. Once
beyond the gap, the malware rapidly replicated throughout the network by
inflicting additional thumb drives, leading personnel to unintentionally spread
the virus further. (Futter 2018, 65).
Evidently, India’s nuclear weapons do face cyber vulnerabilities. In 2016, it
was found that Chinese hackers breached sensitive computer systems at the
headquarters of the Eastern Naval Command in Visakhapatnam, where the
indigenous nuclear submarine, ‘Arihant’ has been undergoing sea trials.
(Vasudeva 2012) Reportedly, the computer systems of DRDO were breached
and some sensitive files were leaked. (Jain 2015) A top defense ministry officer
admitted that ‘cyber command would ensure both offensive and defensive cyber
security capabilities. Issues like cyber warfare, cyber terrorism, and cyber
espionage would be taken care of by cyber command.’ (Sagar 2014).Given, the
vast advancement in cyber technology, India’s nuclear weapons remain
vulnerable to the following possible cyber-attacks scenarios in future that can
damage its critical infrastructure.
• Adversaries may try to hack the nuclear weapons’ system of India with
an intention to damage it.
• By using cyber warfare capabilities, the adversaries may try to know
the exact locations of the weapon system in order to target it first, in the
conflict.
• Adversaries may impact the satellite systems thus making it difficult
for the nuclear command center to have on the spot communications,
selection of target and adversary information.
• There may be intentional hacking of the system to cause a faulty
selection of targets.
• There may be an active stealing of India’s nuclear data.
Given the threat perspectives, it is of urgent necessity that India develops
means to manage and safeguard against cyber threats and maintain the survival
of its critical retaliatory capabilities.
Conclusion
The possibility of cyber-attacks on nuclear weapons and its related
infrastructure is increasing. The computer systems used across all nuclear weapon
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enterprises can potentially fail due to a variety of reasons including as a result
of incorrect, incomplete or faulty design and/or manufacture of the key
components, various problems with the software or the hardware, coding errors
in the software being used like computer bugs and other problems arising due
to human interaction with these systems such as maintenance, updating and
upgrading. These risks must be considered as important factors while devising
current risk management approaches in India’s nuclear policies for mitigating
all cyber threats. As mentioned by Yukiya Amano, the Director of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ‘the issue of cyber-attacks on
nuclear-related facilities or activities should be taken very seriously. We will
never know in certainty if we know everything or if it is just the tip of the
iceberg. This is not an imaginary risk.’ The intensity of episodes with cyber-
attacks on nuclear systems has increased after the STUNEX virus attacks.
Recently, in 2014, there have been malware attacks on Japan’s Nuclear Power
Plant, cyber-attacks on German nuclear systems in April 2016 and hacking of
the computer systems of a South Korean nuclear plant in February 2017.
(McCurry 2014) India cannot declare itself as an exceptional case, which is
foolproof to cyber threats. It is time to recognize the threat and to have a suitable
policy to deal with it.
(The authors wish to thank the Indian Council of Social Science Research
(ICSSR) for providing the necessary support for carrying out this research.)
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